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Abstract— User Centric Ownership Model (UCOM) enables the smart card users to install/delete application they prefer in their smart
card. UCOM provides smart card users to have any number of applications installed on their smart cards. Though UCOM provides
flexibility for the smart card users, it lacks centralized authority. UCOM creates major problem if the user has more than one
application installed in his/her smart card.  Smart card may contain applications from the provider that may interrupt the proper
working of the neighbor applications.  Smart card user may hack his way to a known aboutapplication through a smart card simulator.
Thus, there is no security for an application in the smart card for UCOM model. This survey paper includes background and
motivation about the available encryption algorithms for smart cards such as RSA, ECC, AES, DES, T-DES, ECDSA and the smart
card protocols which can be used to overcome the problem of security for the applications in smart card for UCOM model.
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I.INTRODUCTION
Smart card with multiple applications enables application
form different application provider to co-exist in the single
smart card [1].  Issuer Centric Ownership Model (ICOM) refers
to control and ownership of the smart card by the card issuer
(single application per smart card). User Centric Ownership
Model (UCOM) refers to the control and ownership of the
smart card delegated to the smart card user which supports
multiple application to be installed on a smart card [2]. The
security of a smart card in UCOM is not guaranteed as the
control lies with the smart card user who can be a trustable user
or a malicious user. User Centric Smart Card Framework
(UCF) gives a secure relationship among the entities involved
in UCOM in order to support delegation of the ownership to
smart card user [2].
Smart card is known to be a secure computing device [1].
The most challenging aspect in smart card communication is to
provide security for the smart card applications. Security in
case of Issuer Centric Ownership model is managed by a
centralized authority. But this concept of centralized authority
never exists in UCOM. It is this reason which gives way for
reliable and efficient cryptographic algorithms [1] and secure
channel protocols for multi-application smart cards [4]. Smart
card in general may be any chip which is capable of executing
and storing application securely [2] examples of which include
Universal Integrated Circuit Card, Embedded Secure element,
Secure Memory Card [5, 6] used in NFC [7] enabled mobile
phones.
In this paper, section two deals with the discussion on all
available encryption algorithms which can be used in the smart
card communication to make it secure one. It also includes the
discussion among RSA-ECC, RSA Digital Signature
Algorithm-ECC Digital Signature Algorithm, DES,T-DES and
AES with respect to their execution time, encryption time,
decryption time, signature generation and signature
verification. Section three deals with the need of the secure
channel protocol in smart card communication, the design
requirement of the protocol and the list of all available secure
channel protocols.
II. ENCRYPTION ALGORITHMS
The algorithms developed over years to solve cryptographic
applications is time exponential [8, 9] and is based on integer
factorization [10]. If security is the need for smart card, then
cryptography will remain the best solution [10]. It’s this
encryption which makes smart card secure from cryptanalysis.
Using cryptography to provide security in constrained
environment (Example: smart card) where there is issue with
the bandwidth, computation and memory remains the major
challenge [10]. Confidentiality, Data Integrity, Authentication
and Non-repudiation are the main objectives of cryptography in
smart card. “Long term key in cryptographic algorithms always
promises the security”[11]. The most important progress in the
cryptography system forsmart card is the introduction of
electronic signature.
Encryption algorithms in smart card can be classified as
1. Public Key
2. Private Key
3. Hash Function
Public Key Algorithms can be further classified as
Asymmetric (RSA and ECC) and Digital Signatures (RSA
Digital and ECDSA). Private Key or Symmetric algorithms
include AES, DES and T-DES. Hash Functions include SHA-
1 and SHA-2.
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a) Asymmetric Algorithms- RSA, ECC
Zhang Peng and Jia Jian Fang in 2010 gave the
comparison of RSA and ECC public key cryptosystems based
on their key sizes with respect to the corresponding security
level [12]. Table 1 follows the comparison made by Zhang
Peng and Jia Jian Fang. In the comparison, initial key size for
RSA is considered to be 1024 bits. This is because RSA is
believed to provide high security for key size more than 1024
bits. It can be observed from the table that, the key sizes that
RSA uses for the corresponding security level is very high
when compared to that of ECC. Thus, the computational
power, memory and bandwidth required in case of RSA
implementation in smart card is more when compared to ECC
implementation. ECC compensates for the limitations in smart
card hardware as it doesn’t require any additional hardware
[10]. Since the key generated in ECC is very short, faster
information transfer rate can be achieved.
Figure 1 Key Size comparison for RSA and ECC
b) Digital Signature Algorithms- RSA, ECDSA
Digital Signature process includes signature generation
and signature verification [13]. The comparison of Encryption
in ECC and RSA made by Abdurahmonov Tursun in 2010 can
be put forth as in Figure 2 and Figure 3 [14]. From Figure 2
and Figure 3 it can be observed that, ECC takes less time for
encryption whereas RSA takes less time in decryption.
Signature generation is fast in ECC whereas signature
verification is fast in RSA.
Table 1 shows the results of RSA and ECDSA signature
comparison made by Robshaw and Yin in 1997 in RSA
laboratory [14]. Table 2 shows the results of RSAand ECDSA
signature comparison made by Weiner [14]. Table 3 shows the
results of RSA and ECDSA signature comparison made by
V.Gupta, S.Gupta and D.Stebila [14]. T. Abdurahmonov and
Helmi Mohammed Hussain after comparing RSA and ECDSA
digital signature suggested that, ECDSA is more efficient
Digital Signature Algorithm to be used in smart card [15].
Figure 2 ECC Computation
Figure 3 RSA Computation
Table 1 Comparison of Signature Generation and
Verification
Public Key
Algorithm
Key-size Signature
Generation
Signature
Verification
RSA 1024 7 times Slow 6 times Fast
ECDSA 160 Fast Slow
Table 2 Comparison of Signature Generation and
Verification
Public Key
Algorithm
Key-size Signature
Generation
Signature
Verification
RSA 1024 8 times Slow 30 times Fast
ECDSA 168 Fast Slow
Table 3 Comparison of Signature Generation and Verification
Public Key
Algorithm
Key-size Signature
Generation
Signature
Verification
RSA 1024 5 times Slow 8 times Fast
ECDSA 163 Fast Slow
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c) Symmetric Algorithms- DES, T-DES, AES
The comparison among the symmetric algorithms can be done
as follows
i. An advantage of AES is that it is difficult to attack
when compared to DES / T-DES.  But it’s slower in
computation than DES / T-DES
ii. DES is easy to attack than T-DES / AES. DES is
simpler than AES and faster than T-DES
iii. T-DES overcomes all the problems of DES and
makes the process secure against hacking. T-DES
computation is slower than DES.
Figure 4 Execution Time Comparisons for Symmetric
algorithms
Figure 4 gives the comparison of execution time of DES, T-
DES and AES in seconds on different platforms [14] and
modes (ECB- Electronic Code Book, CFB- Cipher feedback).
Platform A – ECB mode on P-II 266 MHZ machine
Platform B – ECB mode on P-4 2.4 GHZ machine
Platform C–CFB mode on PENTIUM-IL266 MHZ machine
Platform D – CFB mode on P-4 2.4 GHZ machine [14]
III.SMART CARD PROTOCOLS
Protocol may be defined as the set of rules that govern the
communication between the communicating entities.
GlobalPlatform (now OpenPlatform) card specification [16]
provides necessary functionality such as secure storage of keys,
key management and so on which are essential for a smart card
protocol. GlobalPlatform architecture is been coupled with
Java card [17] technology to provide portability to other smart
card platforms [18, 19]. Smart card communication can be
secured by authenticating the communicating entities (card and
the off-card entity) and establishing session keys to preserve
the integrity and confidentiality of the communication. Public
key cryptography is used to establish a secure channel.
Cryptographic protocols designed for smart cards must
consider the limitations of the smart card. If protocols designed
follow large number of messages to be exchanged between the
communication entities, this will in turn results in
communication and processing overheads [20].
UCOM provides the flexibility to have multiple
applications being installed in the smart card. Secure channel
can be used by the application provider to lease the application
to the smart card user in UCOM and also during the entity
authentication or key exchange between the communicating
entities. The application provider leases the application based
on the Application Lease Policy (ALP) [21]. The multiple
applications may need to communicate with the off-card entity
simultaneously. This communication can be provided by
establishing logical channels (as in Figure 5) between an
application and off-card entity which is specific to one
application only. As per the Global Platform Card
specification, the maximum number of logical channels
allowed is 4, ie at any instance only 4 applications can
communicate with the off-card entity. Security to such logical
channel communication is ensured through Secure Channel
Protocol [22].
Every Logical Channel communication [22, 23] provides
an illusion as if the communication happens with a separate
smart card. GlobalPlatform security domains are the on-card
representatives of the card issuer or an application provider in
the UCOM [24].Secure channel protocols are established in
order to communicate with the off-card entity in secure
manner. Every security domain is associated with a secure
channel protocol (SCP) (as in Figure 6).
Figure 5 Logical Channel Communication
Whenever an application uses the security domain for the
communication with the off-card entity, it uses the secure
channel protocol for the communication. Secure Channel
Protocol [24] ensures security for the communication between
the on-card entity (Issuer Security Domain/Application
Security Domain) and off-card entity through the
corresponding logical channel. Secure channel protocol are
used in situation when there is need for card content
management.
Figure 6 Security Domain and Secure Channel Protocol
(SCP)
Secure Channel is a trusted channel which is cryptographically
bounded to the current communicating states of the two
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communicating entities [25]. A secure channel protocol (SCP)
should address the following requirement,
i. SCP should assure that the service provider is
communicating with a genuine smart card platform
and not the simulator [26]
ii. SCP must ensure that the smart card security and
operational environment is certified by a reputed
third party evaluation [26]
Following are the list of currently available Secure (trusted)
Channel Protocols,
i. Station to Station (STS)  protocol [27]
ii. Aziz-Siffie (AD) protocol [28]
iii. ASPeCT protocol [29]
iv. Just Fast Keying (JSF) protocol [30]
v. Trusted TLS protocol (T2LS) [25]
vi. GlobalPlatform
a. SCP01 [31] – deprecated
b. SCP02 [31] – based on T-DES
c. SCP10 [31] – based on Asymmetric key
cryptosystem
d. SCP81 [32] – based on SSL/TLS
e. SCP80 [33] – for mobile telecom industry
vii. Markantonakis-Mayes (MM) protocol [34]
viii. Sirett-Mayes (SM) protocol [35]
ix. Preserving Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol (P-
SCTP) [36]
x. Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol (SCTP) [26]
IV.CONCLUSION
a) Conclusion on Encryption Algorithms
ECC algorithm is more efficient and well suitable for smart
card which has constrained environment. This is because,
ECC key size is very less when compared to that of RSA
which makes ECC faster in computation and well suitable for
smart card which has limitation in memory, bandwidth and
computation power. In some situation RSA algorithm is used
in smart card and not ECC. This is when the key size used for
the RSA is very small for which same level of security is
provided by ECC algorithm even.
b) Conclusion on Digital Signature Algorithms
In conclusion to the comparison made between RSA and
ECDSA digital signature algorithm in section two of this
paper, even though RSA is faster than ECDSA in signature
verification, ECDSA is considered the efficient digital
signature algorithm for smart cards because of the negligible
difference in situations where RSA is faster than ECDSA.
c) Conclusion on Symmetric Algorithms
AES has more advantages over DES / T-DES. Choosing a
symmetric algorithm for encryption solely depends on the
requirement of the system. If security is more concerned than
speed, then AES is the right choice, if speed is more
concerned than security, then DES / T-DES is the right choice.
d) Conclusion on Secure Channel Protocols
This paper aims at demonstrating the importance of Secure
Channel Protocol in smart card communication especially in
UCOM where there is more chances of tampering smart card
application or the keys exchanged between the two
communicating entities in the smart card communication.
V.FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we did the survey on the available
encryption algorithms and protocols for smart card which
would help the smart card to perform secure communication in
User Centric Ownership Model (UCOM). This survey can be
a motivation and helpful for making the smart card
communication more secure and efficient tamper resistant
device.
REFERENCES
[1] “Smart Card Operating Systems: Past, Present and Future,”
in the 5th NORDU/USENIX Conference, 2003.
[2] Akram, Raja Naeem, Konstantinos Markantonakis, and
Keith Mayes. "A Paradigm Shift in Smart Card Ownership
Model." In Computational Science and Its Applications
(ICCSA), 2010 International Conference on, pp. 191-200.
IEEE, 2010.
[3] “Mobile NFC Services,” GSM Association, White Paper
Version 1.0, 2007. [Online]. Available:
http://www.gsmworld.com/documents/nfc_ services_0207.pdf
[4] Markantonakis, Konstantinos, and Keith Mayes. "A Secure
Channel protocol for multi-application smart cards based on
public key cryptography." InCommunications and Multimedia
Security, pp. 79-95. Springer US, 2005.
[5] “The GlobalPlatform Proposition for NFC Mobile: Secure
Element Management and Messaging,” GlobalPlatform, White
Paper, April 2009. [Online]. Available:
http://www.globalplatform.org/documents/GlobalPlatform_N
FC_Mobile_White_Paper.pdf
[6] “Contactless and Flash Memory Cards Combine,” Card
Technology Today, vol. 16, no. 11-12, pp. 6 – 7, 2004.
[Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6W6X-
4DTSP0M-C/2/0a2637d89dbed6d40be388ff9b37945b
[7] “Near Field Communication and the NFC Forum: The
Keys to Truly Interoperable Communications,” White Paper,
November 2006. [Online] Available: www.nfc-
forum.org/resources/white_papers/nfc_forum_marketing_whit
e_paper.pdf
[8] Alfred J. Menezes, “Elliptic curve public key
cryptosystem”, Auburn University, Kluwer
AcademicPublishers, Dordrech, London, 1993.
Proceedings of the International Conference , “Computational Systems for Health & Sustainability”
17-18, April, 2015 - by R.V.College of Engineering,
Bangalore,Karnataka,PIN-560059,INDIA
All Copyrights Reserved by R.V. College of Engineering, Bangalore, Karnataka Page | 123
[9] V. Miller, “Uses of Elliptic Curve in Cryptography”,
Advances in Cryptography, Proceedings of Crypto’85, Lecture
Notes on Computer Sciences, 218, Springer-Verlag, 1986, pp.
417-426.
[10] Jena, Debasish, Saroj Kumar Panigrahy, Pradip Kumar
Biswal, and Sanjay Kumar Jena. "A novel protocol for smart
card using ECDLP." In Emerging Trends in Engineering and
Technology, 2008. ICETET'08. First International Conference
on, pp. 838-843. IEEE, 2008.
[11] Rankl, Wolfgang, and Wolfgang Effing. Smart card
handbook. John Wiley & Sons, 2010.
[12] Peng, Zhang, and Jia Jian Fang. "Comparing and
implementation of public key cryptography algorithms on
smart card." In Computer Application and System Modeling
(ICCASM), 2010 International Conference on, vol. 12, pp.
V12-508. IEEE, 2010.
[13] T. Abdurahmonov, Y. E Thiam, M. H. Helmi,
“Improving smart card security using Elliptic Curve
Cryptography over prime field,” IEEE Xplore. January 28,
2011, Pp.169-173
[14] Savari, Maryam, and Mohammad Montazerolzohour.
"All about encryption in smart card." In Cyber Security, Cyber
Warfare and Digital Forensic (CyberSec), 2012 International
Conference on, pp. 54-59. IEEE, 2012.
[15] Nadeem, Aamer, and M. Younus Javed. "A performance
comparison of data encryption algorithms." In Information and
communication technologies, 2005. ICICT 2005. First
international conference on, pp. 84-89. IEEE, 2005.
[16] Global Platform. “Open Platform Card Specification”,
Version 2.1. June 2001. http://www.globalplatform.org.
[17] Javasoft. “Java Card Platform Specifications”, Version
2.2, September 2002.
http://java.sun.com/products/javacard/specs.html
[18]Microsoft “Windows for Smart Card”.
http://www.microsoft.com/HWDEV/TECH/input/smartcard/
[19] MAOSCO. “MULTOS Reference Manual Ver 1.2”.
http://www.multos.com/
[20] K. Markantonakis. "Is the Performance of the
Cryptographic Functions the Real Bottleneck?", IFIP TC11
16th International Conference on Information Security
(IFIP/SEC'01), June 11-13, 2001, Paris, France, In "Trusted
Information: The New Decade Challenge" , Kluwer Academic
Publishers , ISBN 0-7923-7389-8, pages 77-92.
[21] “Application Management Framework in User Centric
Smart Card Ownership Model,” in The 10th
InternationalWorkshop on Information Security Applications
(WISA09), ser. LNCS, H. Y. YOUM and M. Yung, Eds., vol.
5932/2009. Busan, Korea: Springer, August 2009, pp. 20–35.
[22] Akram, Raja Naeem, Konstantinos Markantonakis, and
Keith Mayes. "A Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol for the
User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model." In Trust,
Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications
(TrustCom), 2013 12th IEEE International Conference on, pp.
336-345. IEEE, 2013
[23] Oracle Documentation on Java CardTM Technology
(dated March 6th 2015)
[24] GlobalPlatform Card Specification Version 2.2.1 January
2011
[25] Y. Gasmi, A.-R. Sadeghi, P. Stewin, M. Unger, and N.
Asokan, “Beyond Secure Channels,” in STC ’07:
Proceedingsof the 2007 ACM workshop on Scalable
trustedcomputing. NY, USA: ACM, 2007, pp. 30–40.
[26] Akram, Raja Naeem, Konstantinos Markantonakis, and
Keith Mayes. "A Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol for the
User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model." In Trust,
Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications
(TrustCom), 2013 12th IEEE International Conference on, pp.
336-345. IEEE, 2013.
[27] W. Diffie, P. C. Van Oorschot, and M. J. Wiener,
“Authentication and Authenticated Key Exchanges,” Des.
CodesCryptography, vol. 2, pp. 107–125, June 1992.
[28] A. Aziz and W. Diffie, “Privacy And Authentication For
Wireless Local Area Networks,” IEEE Personal
Communications, vol. 1, pp. 25–31, First Quarter 1994.
[29] G. Horn and B. Preneel, “Authentication and payment in
future mobile systems,” in Computer Security ˚U
ESORICS98, ser. LNCS, J.-J. Quisquater, Y. Deswarte, C.
Meadows, and D. Gollmann, Eds. Springer, 1998, vol. 1485,
pp. 277– 293, 10.1007/BFb0055870.
[30] W. Aiello, S. M. Bellovin, M. Blaze, R. Canetti, J.
Ioannidis, A. D. Keromytis, and O. Reingold, “Just fast
keying: Key agreement in a hostile internet,” ACM Trans. Inf.
Syst. Secur., vol. 7, pp. 242–273, May 2004.
[31] GlobalPlatform: GlobalPlatform Card
Specification,Version 2.2,, Online, GlobalPlatform
Specification, March 2006.
[32] Remote Application Management over HTTP, Online,
GlobalPlatform Specification, September 2006.
[33] “Smart Cards; Secured Packet Structure for UICC based
Applications (Release 6),” ETSI, France, Tech. Rep. ETSI TS
102 225 (V6.8.0), April 2006.
[34] K. Markantonakis and K. Mayes, “A Secure Channel
Protocol for Multi-application Smart Cards based on Public
Key Cryptography,” in CMS 2004 - Eight IFIP TC-6-11
Conference onCommunications and Multimedia Security, D.
Chadwick and B. Prennel, Eds. Springer, Sep 2004, pp. 79–96.
[35] W. G. Sirett, J. A. MacDonald, K. Mayes, and C.
Markantonakis, “Design, Installation and Execution of a
Security Agent for Mobile Stations,” in Smart Card Research
andAdvanced Applications (CARDIS), ser. LNCS, J.
Domingo- Ferrer, J. Posegga, and D. Schreckling, Eds., vol.
3928. Spain: Springer, April 2006, pp. 1–15.
[36] R. N. Akram, K. Markantonakis, and K. Mayes, “A
Privacy Preserving Application Acquisition Protocol,” in 11th
IEEEInternational Conference on Trust, Security and
Privacyin Computing and Communications (IEEE TrustCom-
12), F. G. M. Geyong Min, Ed. Liverpool, United Kingdom:
IEEE Computer Society, June 2012.
